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Abstract 
This paper analyses the economic disadvantage experienced by disabled persons 
of working-age using data from the British Household Panel Survey. We argue 
that there are three sources of disadvantage among disabled persons: pre-
existing disadvantage among those who become disabled (a ‘selection’ effect), 
the effect of disability onset itself, and the effects associated with remaining 
disabled post-onset. We show that employment rates fall with disability onset, 
and continue to fall the longer a disability spell lasts, whereas average income 
falls sharply with onset but then recovers subsequently (though not to pre-onset 
levels).  
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1. Introduction 
Disabled Britons of working-age face considerable economic disadvantage 
compared to working-age people without a disability. On average their incomes 
are about 20 per cent lower than the incomes of non-disabled individuals of 
working-age, and their employment rates are half the size: see Burchardt 
(2000b), Grundy et al. (1999), and evidence that we present below. In this paper 
we argue that such summary statistics provide a potentially misleading picture 
of the relationship between disability and disadvantage. The reason is that 
economic disadvantage among currently-disabled individuals may arise from 
three potential sources: pre-existing disadvantage (a ‘selection’ effect), effects 
associated with the onset of disability, and the effects associated with remaining 
disabled post-onset. We argue that these dimensions should be examined 
separately, and illustrate our case using data from the British Household Panel 
Survey.  
 
Our distinction between selection, onset and duration effects is derived from 
taking a longitudinal perspective to disability and disadvantage. This contrasts 
with previous analysis of the incomes and employment rates of disabled Britons 
which has mostly been based on cross-section surveys. Among these, the most 
important specialist surveys have been the Disability Follow-Up Survey to the 
Family Resources Survey (Grundy et al., 1999) and the Baseline Survey for 
monitoring the employment provisions of the Disability Discrimination Act 
(Meager et al., 1998).  
 
There are three reasons why ‘snapshot’ information at a point in time for a 
sample of individuals may provide an inaccurate description of the impact of 
disability on disadvantage (Burkhauser and Daly, 1996). First, such surveys 
cannot differentiate between differences in outcomes that are due to factors 
existing before onset and differences that are due to onset itself. This is of 
policy relevance because the former may not be eliminated by policy measures 
targeted at people who are disabled. Second, with a cross-sectional snapshot one 
cannot learn how the relationship between disadvantage and disability status 
develops over time from onset and afterwards. Put another way, and from the 
policy-maker’s perspective, one has little information about the time frame 
within which there are opportunities for intervention. As Burchardt has 
emphasised, ‘disability is not a fixed characteristic of individuals, at least within 
the working population’ (2000a, p. 664), and she argues that disability policy-
making would be improved by recognition of disability trajectories and their 
variety. Third, cross-sectional samples contain a relatively high proportion of 
long-term cases. (This is a well-known property of ‘stock sampling’, and is 
illustrated by, for example, Burchardt, 2000a.) If disadvantage increases the 
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longer that a disabled person stays disabled, then a cross-section sample can 
over-estimate the impact of disability onset on economic outcomes. 
 
More generally, the distinction between selection, onset and duration effects 
helps pin down the sources of the low incomes and employment rates of 
disabled people. As HM Treasury has stated in a related context, ‘[s]napshot 
data can lead people to focus on the symptoms of the problem rather than 
addressing the underlying processes which lead people to have or be denied 
opportunities’ (HM Treasury 1999: 5). Development of complete models of 
processes is beyond the scope of this paper, but we offer analysis that aims to 
take some first steps in this direction. For each of the selection, onset, and 
duration processes, we use multivariate regression analysis to study the 
relationships between differences in personal characteristics (such as 
educational qualifications) and changes in employment rates and income. 
 
Longitudinal data are required in order to trace changes in income and 
employment over the period stretching from before the onset of a disability to 
some time after onset. We use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the 
source for the three existing studies of disability in Britain from a longitudinal 
perspective. Burchardt (2000a) focused on movements into and out of disability 
itself. Her report (2000b) also studied employment transitions. Bardasi et al. 
(2000) compared British disability and disadvantage with patterns reported for 
the USA and Germany by Burkhauser and Daly (1998). Virtually all other UK 
studies of disability from a longitudinal perspective have focused on disability 
benefits rather than total net income (and low income) or employment: see, for 
example, Holmes et al.’s (1991) study of transitions onto and off invalidity 
benefit. The contribution of the current paper is its identification, and joint 
analysis of, the selection, onset, and duration effects, and their impacts on 
individuals’ total net incomes (not only their benefit income or their labour 
earnings) and their employment rates. 
 
In Section 2, we describe our BHPS samples and definitions of disability, 
income and employment. In Sections 3 and 4, we analyze selection, onset, and 
duration effects. We document the extent of pre-existing disadvantage among 
individuals who subsequently became disabled, and describe how income 
levels, low-income rates, and employment rates changed when individuals 
began a spell of disability, and how these measures changed as the spell of 
disability progressed. Section 5 provides a summary and conclusions. 
 
 3 
2. Data and Definitions 
2.1  Data: The British Household Panel Survey 
Our analysis uses data from the first eight waves of the BHPS, covering the 
period from 1991–8.1 The first wave of the BHPS was a nationally 
representative sample of the population of Great Britain living in private 
households in 1991. Original sample respondents (including both partners from 
dissolved wave one partnerships) have been followed, and they and co-resident 
adults have been interviewed at approximately one-year intervals ever since. 
Children in original sample households have also been interviewed when they 
reach the age of 16 years. To account for potential differential non-response in 
the initial interview wave and for subsequent differential attrition, we used the 
relevant BHPS sample weights where appropriate.2   
 
We focused on individuals of working age: men aged 16–64 years and women 
aged 16–59 years. 
 
2.2  The definition of disability and its onset  
The results reported in this paper use a definition of disability based on whether 
a person had a work-limiting health condition.3 Respondents were classified as 
disabled if they answered yes to the BHPS question that asks ‘Does your health 
limit the type of work or amount of work that you can do?’ This definition has 
also been used extensively by Burchardt (2000a), and is very similar to the 
definition commonly derived from US social surveys such as the Panel Study of 
Income Dynamics (see, for example, Burkhauser and Daly, 1996, 1998). (For a 
useful overview of the relative merits of self-reported and ‘objective’ measures 
of disability, see Bound (1991).)  
 
We also explored the consequences of using a disability definition that 
accounted for severity, counting as disabled only the subset of individuals who 
                                         
1
  Data from only the first eight BHPS waves were used because the set of health and 
disability questions changed in wave 9. 
2
  For more information about the BHPS sample design, representativeness and 
methods, see Taylor (2001). 
3
  The work-limited definition of disability falls between definitions implied by the 
individual and social models of disability (Barnes, 1991; Nagi, 1969; Oliver, 1996). It 
is based on questions about ‘impairment’, while relating these to the extent to which a 
person can engage in particular environments. We also checked the validity of BHPS 
disability measures with comparisons of prevalence rates based on alternative 
definitions in other national surveys (a brief Appendix is available from the authors 
on request). 
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had a work-limiting health condition as above, and either (i) when asked, ‘for 
the work that you can do, how much does your health limit the amount of work 
you can do?’ said that it was ‘a lot’ or ‘somewhat’, or (ii) when asked ‘does 
your health keep you from doing some types of work?’ said that they ‘can do 
nothing’. Changing to this more restrictive definition reduced the number of 
people counted as disabled in the cross-section, as expected, but longitudinal 
patterns – the focus of the paper – were little affected (results available from the 
authors on request).  
 
We defined disability onset to have occurred if an individual was not disabled 
for at least two consecutive annual interviews and then reported disability at the 
next two interviews. This is the same definition that Burkhauser and Daly 
(1996) used, and enabled us to focus on ‘long-term’, non-transitory, disability 
experiences, the primary focus of government disability policy.4 The length of a 
disability spell was measured in terms of the number of annual interviews at 
which the relevant individual was counted as being disabled, including the year 
of onset. One practical problem with our onset definition is that it requires four 
consecutive years’ data to implement, a factor reducing sample numbers. We 
therefore repeated our calculations using a three-year definition that allowed 
‘temporary’ spells: onset occurred if two interviews without disability were 
followed by a report of disability at the next interview (resulting in a sample of 
803 spells rather than 280 spells). Patterns of results were robust to this change 
(results available from the authors on request). 
 
2.3  Subsamples used in the analysis  
The definitions of disability and its onset led to several subsamples for analysis: 
(a) all individuals who were disabled at the date of the annual interview (the 
‘currently disabled’ sample); and  
(b) all individuals who were not disabled at the annual interview (the 
‘currently non-disabled’ sample) 
(c) the subset of individuals at risk of disability onset who experienced 
disability onset (the ‘onset sample’, whom we also followed post-onset);  
(d) the subset of individuals at risk of disability onset who did not experience 
disability onset; 
 
Samples (a) and (b) provided cross-sectional reference points concerning the 
stock of disabled and non-disabled individuals at a given point in time (as in 
cross-section surveys). For these two subsamples, we pooled data from BHPS 
waves 1–8.  
                                         
4
  See Burchardt (2000a) for more about the complexity of the dynamics of disability.  
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Samples (c) and (d) were the longitudinal samples used to examine selection, 
onset, and duration effects.5 They were also constructed by combining data 
across waves. However when considering disability onset, we restricted analysis 
to the first spell observed within the eight-year panel in order to abstract from 
issues arising from repeated disability episodes. (We cannot measure repeat-
spell prevalence comprehensively because there is no information about 
respondents’ disability experiences before the first BHPS interviews in 1991.) 
Among individuals for whom income was non-missing, there were 280 
individuals who experienced disability onset (sample c), and 10,753 individuals 
(20,457 person-years) who were at risk of onset but did not experience it 
(sample d).  
 
By construction, all individuals in the onset sample were disabled for at least 
two years. About 80 percent remained disabled a further year, and two-thirds of 
those beginning a disability spell remained disabled for at least four years.6 The 
number of individuals in sample (c) with longer spells was small. For example, 
there were only about 50 individuals with a disability spell lasting at least five 
years, and only 20 individuals with a disability spell lasting for at least six 
years. (This is the maximum possible spell length in an eight-year panel, given 
that we also need to observe at least two years without a disability as part of the 
definition of disability onset.) Because of these small cell sizes, our analysis of 
duration effects (Section 4) focused on incomes and employment in the early 
years of a disability spell.  
 
2.4  The definitions of economic disadvantage  
Economic disadvantage was defined in terms of individuals’ employment status, 
their income, and whether they had a low income. 
 
                                         
5
  We only examined onsets for individuals of working age, thereby excluding onset 
among children (aged younger than 16). If the economic potential for the latter group 
is significantly different from that of the former group, then our assessments of the 
selection effect may be biased. We cannot assess this because the BHPS only 
interviews individuals aged 16+, but we believe it to be a negligible problem. The 
prevalence of disability rises sharply with age, which suggests that the number of 
younger individuals who become disabled is relatively small. For example, 
individuals aged 16–21 accounted for around five percent of the subsample (a). 
Moreover, most of these did not report a work-limiting health problem at every wave. 
6
  These lifetable estimates are smaller than those reported by Burchardt (2000a, Figure 
3) using data from BHPS waves 1–7. The reason is that we use a different definition 
of onset (for the reasons discussed earlier). When we applied a similar definition, the 
patterns were very similar. 
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We defined individuals to be working if they were currently employed or self-
employed. Respondents were asked whether they did any paid work during the 
last week (either as an employee or self-employed), or whether they did not do 
paid work last week but had a job that they were away from.  
 
By ‘income’ we mean household net income, adjusted for differences in 
household composition using an equivalence scale. The definition is the same as 
the ‘before housing costs’ income measure used in the official low income 
statistics (Department for Work and Pensions, 2002).7 Income could not be 
calculated for households in which there were one or more non-respondents and 
this reduced sample sizes in some analyses reported below. (Previous research 
by the authors suggests that such exclusions do not bias analysis.) We also used 
information about the composition of total income, especially the shares of 
income from labour earnings and from benefits, when examining trajectories in 
total income around the time of the onset of disability. 
 
We made no adjustment to incomes for the additional costs associated with 
being disabled, such as the costs of personal care. Burchardt (2000b, Table 10) 
estimated that the proportion of disabled people in poverty in 1996/7 would 
increase from 40 percent to 51 percent if additional costs were taken into 
account. (She defined poverty to mean having an income less than half the mean 
income among all adults in non-pensioner families.) Only two-fifths to one half 
of these additional costs are met through the benefit system (Burchardt, 2000b, 
Table 12). In the context of the present analysis, adjusting for additional costs 
would not only reduce the incomes of disabled people, but this ‘extra’ economic 
disadvantage would be associated with disability onset. Thus the present 
analysis potentially understates the effects of disability onset on income. 
 
We defined individuals as having low income if their income placed them in the 
poorest fifth of the working-age population, where the bottom-quintile threshold 
was calculated separately for each survey year.  
 
                                         
7
  Household net income (‘before housing costs’) is the sum of cash income from all 
sources, minus direct income taxes and National Insurance contributions, deflated by 
the McClements BHC equivalence scale, and expressed in August 2000 prices. For 
details of the BHPS net income data set, see Bardasi et al. (1999). The data are 
available from the UK Data Archive (http://www.data-archive.ac.uk, study number 
SN3909). 
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3.  The Selection Effect 
The hypothesis underlying the selection effect is straightforward: that some of 
the economic disadvantage observed among individuals who are currently 
disabled arises because a significant fraction of them were already 
disadvantaged before they became disabled. That is, current disadvantage 
reflects a pre-existing condition, rather than (or as well as) the effects of 
disability itself. We label the effect a ‘selection’ effect, because it is as if the 
onset of disability selects from the pool of individuals at risk of becoming 
disabled, those individuals who are already more disadvantaged. For related 
discussion about the relationship between lone motherhood and economic 
disadvantage, see Jenkins, Ermisch and Wright (1990).  
 
We examined the selection effect overall (on average), and then also looked in 
more detail at the characteristics associated with selection into disability. The 
analysis was based on the sample of all individuals who were at risk of 
becoming disabled and comparisons of base year incomes and employment 
status between two groups – those who subsequently became disabled (sample 
c) versus those who did not (sample d). The base year used in our calculations 
was the year two years prior to potential onset of a disability.8 If the selection 
effect exists, then it should manifest itself in terms of lower incomes and 
employment rates for the former group compared to the latter.  
 
Table 1 both sets the scene and provides evidence about the selection effect. 
Columns (a) and (b) summarise the incomes and employment of individuals 
who were ‘currently’ disabled and not disabled. The breakdowns show that, on 
average, disabled people were relatively badly off in the 1990s. Their median 
income was only 79 percent of the median for non-disabled individuals, and 
almost one-third were in the poorest fifth of the income distribution (compared 
to 18 percent among the non-disabled). 42 percent of disabled people were in 
paid employment compared with almost 80 percent among non-disabled people.  
 
                                         
8
  We did not use the year prior to potential onset as the base year for comparisons as 
this could have mixed up selection effects with the effects associated with disability 
onset. Arguably one should use a base year more than two years prior to potential 
offset but, with our eight-wave panel, this would have led to cell sizes that were too 
small.  
 8 
Table 1: Incomes, low-income rates and employment rates, by disability 
status  
 
Currently 
disabled 
Not 
currently 
disabled 
At risk of 
onset and 
became 
disabled 
At risk of 
onset and did 
not become 
disabled 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
Median income (pounds per week) 254 323 275 313 
(As % of median income among 
those currently not disabled) (79) (100) (85) (97) 
Mean income (pounds per week) 297 374 309 358 
(As % of mean income among 
those currently not disabled) (79) (100) (83) (96) 
Percentage in poorest fifth of working-age 
population 32 18 21 17 
Percentage in poorest half of working-age 
population 65 48 58 48 
Percentage in paid work 42 79 73 80 
     
N (person waves) 6,478 45,602 280 20,457 
N (persons) 2,418 10,405 280 10,753 
 
Notes: Incomes, low-income and employment rates refer to current year for samples (a) and 
(b) and to base year for samples (b) and (d): see main text. For samples (a) and (b), the 
number of persons refers to the number of persons ever disabled or ever not disabled 
respectively. Samples (c) and (d) together refer to all individuals at risk of entry to disability 
(based on longitudinal samples). Income is net current household income, expressed in 
August 2000 prices, adjusted for differences in household size and composition using the 
McClements equivalence scale. Income groups were computed separately for each year. 
Cross-section samples weighted using BHPS cross-sectional respondent weights; longitudinal 
samples weighted using BHPS longitudinal respondent weights. Source: authors’ calculations 
from BHPS waves 1–8. 
 
We now turn to the evidence for the selection effect based on comparisons 
among individuals who were at risk of disability onset: see columns (c) and (d) 
of Table 1. It is clear that incomes and employment rates for those who 
experienced disability onset were worse than for the individuals who were also 
at risk of onset but did not experience it. On average, base year median income 
was twelve percent lower for the onset sample (£275 per week rather than 
£313), and 21 percent were in the poorest fifth of the working-age population 
rather than 17 percent. Individuals who experienced onset were also less likely 
to be in paid work: 73 per cent worked in the base year, compared to 80 per cent 
of those who did not experience disability onset.  
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To help understand selection according to prior disadvantage, it is useful to look 
in more detail at the differences in risk of onset across individuals with different 
characteristics – how do these differ from the overall onset rate of 1.3 percent? 
Table 2 shows that onset risks were substantially higher for individuals aged 
50+ (2.5 percent), or with no educational qualifications (2.3 percent), those 
living in households with 2+ children (2.5 percent). By contrast, differences in 
onset rates by sex, or by numbers of adults in the household, were relatively 
small.  
 
Although these differences are suggestive about the principal mechanisms 
through which the selection effect operates, multivariate analysis reveals more. 
We wish to examine the impact on onset rates of differences in each 
characteristic while controlling for the impact of other characteristics. Second it 
is also useful to examine whether the characteristics associated with high onset 
risks are also characteristics that are associated with greater economic 
disadvantage in general. If they are, one may talk of selection into disability 
according to that characteristic, rather than just an average selection effect. To 
implement these ideas, we first estimated a logistic regression model for the 
probability of disability onset, for which the regressors included the 
characteristics that were used in Table 2. Second we estimated (cross-sectional) 
regressions for (log) income, the probability of having low income, and the 
probability of not being in paid work, in which the explanatory variables were 
the same as for the disability onset regression. Third, we checked whether the 
estimated impacts of corresponding explanatory variables on their respective 
dependent variables were consistent with the hypothesis. Table 3 summarizes 
the multivariate analysis.9 
 
 
                                         
9
  Throughout the paper, we use the same set of explanatory variables in each of the 
regressions that we report – this is to facilitate comparisons across equations and 
processes. We also estimated a range of additional models with different explanatory 
variables and specifications, but they told much the same story as the one reported. 
The explanatory variables are characterised using a relatively small number of 
categories in order to avoid small cell sizes.  
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Table 2: The risks of being disabled and of disability onset, by type of 
individual (row percentages) 
Type of individual Currently 
disabled 
Not 
currently 
disabled 
At risk of 
onset and 
became 
disabled 
At risk of 
onset and did 
not become 
disabled 
 (a) (b) (c) (d) 
All individuals 13.0 87.0 1.3 98.7 
     
Woman 12.8 87.2 1.5 98.5 
Man 13.2 86.8 1.2 98.8 
Age (years)     
 16–34 7.4 92.6 1.0 99.0 
 35–49 12.3 87.7 1.4 98.6 
 50+ 25.7 74.3 2.5 97.5 
Highest educational qualification     
 No qualifications 24.1 75.9 2.3 97.7 
 Vocational  16.1 83.9 1.9 98.1 
 O-levels 9.8 90.2 1.0 99.0 
 A-levels 9.5 90.5 0.9 99.1 
 Technical/nursing/other higher 10.3 89.7 1.2 98.8 
 Degree 7.0 93.0 0.7 99.3 
Number of adults in household     
 1 15.9 84.1 1.6 98.4 
 2 12.7 87.3 1.4 98.6 
 3+ 12.4 83.6 1.1 98.9 
Number of children in household     
 0 10.4 89.6 1.1 98.9 
 1 9.1 90.9 1.2 98.8 
 2+ 12.6 87.4 2.5 97.5 
 
Note: definitions of samples (a)–(d) and sample sizes are the same as for Table 1. 
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The selection role of educational qualifications was strongly corroborated. 
Controlling for other factors, having no educational qualifications not only 
raised the odds of disability onset (by over 55 percent), but was also associated 
with having a lower income, a much higher chance of having low income (odds 
ratio 2.4), and of not being in paid employment (odds ratio 2.5).10 A similar 
story can be told about the impact of having a job. Compared to jobless 
individuals, those in work were not only less likely to become disabled (odds 
ratio 0.67), but also had a higher income and a lower probability of having low 
income (odds ratio 0.15). The results for other characteristics were not so clear 
cut. For example, sex and household composition did not have statistically 
significant associations with onset risks. Disability onset risks increased with 
age, but the relationship between the income and employment variables and age 
was more complicated. For example, although the odds of disability onset were 
higher for those aged 35–49 than for those aged 16–34, the former group had 
smaller rather than larger low-income risks. 
 
Although incomes and employment rates for individuals who became disabled 
were worse than for individuals who did not, they were distinctly better than 
those for currently disabled individuals (sample a). For example, the median 
income among currently disabled individuals was 21 per cent lower than the 
median for currently non-disabled individuals (Table 1), a shortfall one and a 
half times as large as that for those in onset sample (c). Moreover, the base-year 
employment rate among the onset sample was almost twice the rate for the 
currently disabled. This is a reminder that selection effect does not account for 
all of the economic disadvantage experienced by disabled people. There are also 
onset and duration effects, to which we now turn.  
 
 
                                         
10
  In the present context, the odds ratio is the probability that a person experiences 
disability onset relative to the probability that he or she does not experience onset. 
The coefficients for each characteristic show the effect of having that characteristic on 
the odds of onset. An odds ratio of one means that a person with a particular 
characteristic is just as likely to experience onset as a person in the reference 
category; an odds ratio of two (or half) means that person is twice (or half) as likely to 
experience onset as someone in the reference category. 
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Table 3: Multivariate analysis of characteristics associated with disability 
onset, income, low income, and employment  
 Pr(disability onset) Pr(not in work) Log income Pr(low income) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Explanatory variables Odds ratio Odds ratio Coeff. Odds ratio 
Female ns 1.679***   0.026*** 0.861*** 
Aged 35–49 1.444** 0.463***   0.071*** 0.727*** 
Aged 50+ 2.807*** 1.544*** ns 0.725*** 
No educ. qualifications 1.553*** 2.451*** –0.243*** 2.364*** 
In paid work 0.665*** –   0.480*** 0.149*** 
2 adults in household ns 0.501***   0.311*** 0.282*** 
3+ adults in household ns 0.635***   0.211*** 0.257*** 
1 child in household ns 1.487*** –0.213*** 1.883*** 
2+ children in household ns 2.052*** –0.426*** 3.722*** 
     
Mean of dependent 
variable 
0.01 0.26 5.73 0.19 
N (person-waves) 20,591 51,450 51,311 51,354 
R-squared   0.262  
Log-likelihood –1,430 –27,101  –19,912 
 
Models (1), (3), (4) estimated by maximum likelihood logistic regression; model (2) 
estimated by ordinary least squares. Model (1) was based on subsamples (c) and (d) 
combined, with explanatory variables measured at base year values. Models (2)–(4) were 
based on subsamples (a) and (b) combined, with explanatory variables measured 
contemporaneously. In all models, robust standard errors were estimated, accounting for 
repeated observations on the same individuals and from the same household. ns: not 
significant at ≤ 10% level. **: significant at 5% level; ***: significant at 1% level. Low 
income: income in the poorest fifth of the working-age population. Regressions also included 
intercept terms, and controls for respondent’s travel-to-work-area unemployment rate, and 
year of interview. Reference categories: male, aged 16–34, had educational qualifications, not 
in work, childless, single-adult household, survey year was 1991. Source: authors’ 
calculations using pooled data from BHPS waves 1–8. 
 
4.  The Effects of Disability Onset and Duration 
We now focus on the subsample of individuals who experienced disability 
onset, and examine how their incomes and employment changed both around 
the time of onset, and also as the disability spell lengthened. As with the 
selection effect, we consider not only overall average effects, but also how 
experiences differed among individuals with different characteristics.  
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4.1  Onset and duration effects overall 
Overall effects were examined by tracing average incomes, low-income and 
employment rates from two years before onset through to up to three years after 
onset for those remaining disabled. If the onset effect were strong, we would 
expect to see a marked dip in employment rates and income in the period 
surrounding disability onset. The importance of duration effects was gauged 
from the extent to which employment rates and income continued to fall as 
spells lengthened. 
 
The results are summarised in Figures 1–3 for three indicators: median income, 
proportion with low income, and proportion in paid work. Estimates were 
calculated for three subgroups whose membership was defined according to 
how long individuals remained disabled post-onset: individuals dropped out of 
these samples either because their disability spell ended or because the spell was 
still in progress in the last year of the panel.11 The outcomes for the subgroups 
observed for three or four years were generally worse, in each spell year, than 
the corresponding outcomes for the subgroups observed for a shorter period. 
This is what one would expect if individuals who leave disability have better 
economic prospects than those remaining. (It was because of the changing 
composition of the sample that remained disabled, that we did not pool the 
various subgroups when calculating outcomes.) We return to this issue below.  
 
Figures 1–3 show that there were substantial falls in the employment rate and 
median income, and a rise in the prevalence of low-income, between the pre-
onset base year (labelled year –2 in the Figures) and the onset year (year 0). 
Taking the sample of all individuals disabled at least two years for illustration, 
between the base year and the onset year, the proportion in paid work fell by 26 
percent (from 73 to 55), median income fell by 12 percent (from 282 to 249), 
the proportion with low income rose by 18 percentage points (from 21 to 39). 
(The increase in the proportion with low income was much greater than the 
decline in median income, because most of the relevant group were located 
close to the low-income threshold in the first place.)  
 
 
                                         
11
  For these calculations, we also excluded individuals who had missing income values 
at any of the interviews during the disability spell. This resulted in samples of 253, 
135 and 76 individuals who were disabled for at least two, three and four years, 
respectively.  
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Figure 1: Percentage in paid work before and after disability onset 
Notes: The year of disability onset is year 0. Source: authors’ calculations using pooled data 
from BHPS waves 1–8. 
 
The falls in employment rates and incomes occurred in both of the years 
between the base year and the onset year, which suggests that it may be difficult 
to attribute the changes over the two-year window to disability onset itself. 
However, contrary to this hypothesis, we would note that the changes were 
more marked between the pre-onset year (year –1) and the onset year (year 0) 
than between the base year and the pre-onset year. Moreover one might expect 
onset effects to be spread over time anyway: onset is often a gradual process 
rather than a sudden one-time event.12 
 
 
                                         
12
  An alternative explanation for the decline over the pre-onset year is that individuals 
may have an incentive to describe themselves as having a work-limitation following a 
decline in income (which itself may reflect the loss of a job): disability benefits may 
be more generous than unemployment benefits. However, we also observed a similar 
decline in economic circumstances when we defined disability in terms of limitations 
in daily activities rather than work. 
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Figure 2: Median income before and after disability onset 
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Notes: The year of disability onset is year 0. Source: authors’ calculations using pooled data 
from BHPS waves 1–8. 
 
We would expect the income changes to reflect employment changes, and this is 
what we found. 73 percent of those who were disabled for at least two years 
worked in the base year and, of this group (n = 185), some 31 percent were no 
longer in paid employment in the onset year. For this group, median income fell 
over the two-year period by 29 percent (from £295 to £209) and their low-
income rate increased dramatically, from 11 percent to 43 percent. By contrast, 
among those who remained in paid employment, median income fell by ‘only’ 5 
percent (from £314 to £298) and the low-income rate increased from 9 percent 
to 21 percent. The reduction in income, despite no loss of employment, may 
have arisen from reductions in hours worked (for example a shift from full-time 
work to part-time work). 
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Figure 3: Percentage with low income before and after disability onset 
 
Notes: The year of disability onset is year 0. A low income is an income in the poorest fifth 
of the working age population. Source: authors’ calculations using pooled data from BHPS 
waves 1–8. 
 
What about duration effects? Figures 1–3 reveal that post-onset trajectories for 
employment rates and incomes went in opposite directions. Employment rates 
declined continuously as disability spell lengthened. For individuals disabled at 
least two years, the employment rate fell from 55 per cent in the onset year to 52 
per cent a year later. For individuals disabled four years or more, only 30 
percent were in work in their fourth year of disability, compared to 42 percent in 
the onset year.  
 
An obvious explanation for the decline is that the longer you are disabled, the 
fewer opportunities and capabilities to work you have (Meager et al., 1998), but 
such conclusions need to be made with caution. (The causality may also run in 
the opposite direction. It may be that the longer that an unemployed disabled 
individual is without a job, the greater the propensity to report having a work-
limiting health condition, for example because it makes the worklessness easier 
to come to terms with psychologically, because long-term unemployment is bad 
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for one’s health, or because disability benefits may be more attractive than 
unemployment benefits.)  
 
Median incomes either rose or remained more or less unchanged in the year 
after onset. The most notable change in income during this period was a rise in 
median income of 2 percent (from £249 to £254) among those disabled for at 
least two years, though income remained below its base year level.13 There is no 
consistent pattern to the changes in median incomes in the third of fourth years 
of disability, perhaps reflecting sampling variability given the small cell sizes. 
In the year after onset, low-income rates typically recovered though not to pre-
onset levels (the only group where the low-income rate remained unchanged 
was those disabled for at least four years). This ‘short-term’ recovery was not 
sustained as low-income rates increased in the third and fourth year of 
disability. Again there was evidence of the importance of employment for 
understanding the income patterns. For example, among those individuals who 
were disabled for at least two years, median income increased 14 percent 
between the onset year and the next year for those who remained in 
employment, whereas it only increased by half as much (7 percent) among those 
who remained out of work. Low income rates fell by 32 percent for the first 
group and 8 percent for the second. 
 
In sum, the longer disability spells were, the lower were employment rates.  The 
pattern of economic disadvantage in terms of income was more complicated. 
There was a recovery in median income and low-income rates in the year after 
onset for most individuals, though low-income rates increased in subsequent 
years of disability. Interestingly, since the post-onset recovery in income 
occurred despite reductions in average employment rates, there must have been 
changes in other sources of household income that (partially) offset the decline 
in earnings. We now examine this in more detail.  
 
4.2  How income sources changed around the time of disability onset 
We investigated changes in eight types of income in the years surrounding 
disability onset for the sample of individuals who were disabled for at least two 
                                         
13
  The changes in median income should be assessed in the context of a general rise in 
living standards among the working-age population as a whole over the 1990s. Over 
the first eight years of the BHPS, median (real) income among working-age 
individuals increased by an average of approximately two per cent per annum. Thus, 
the pre-onset median income of £276 for individuals who experienced at least two 
years of disability would have had to increase to £293 three years later (the second 
year of disability) in order just to keep pace with the rest of the working-age 
population (median income for this group was £249 in this year). In contrast, the low-
income estimates account for changes in relative incomes, because the low-income 
cut-off was computed separately each year. 
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years. Average income levels and shares in total income are shown for each 
source in Table 4.  
 
Disability onset was associated with an average income reduction of £26 per 
week, of which some £22 had been regained within a year. (These trends in 
mean income track those for median income shown in Figure 2.) Post-onset 
trends in income composition were mostly a continuation of the pattern of 
change associated with onset. For example, the reduction in mean income 
between the base year (two years before onset) and the year after onset was 
largely driven by a £61 reduction in own labour income. Post-onset, own labour 
income represented only about one third of total net income, compared to 54 per 
cent pre-onset. This is of course consistent with the trends in employment rates 
over the same period. 
  
The main source of income replacement was the welfare state. Respondents’ 
own disability benefits and other household benefit income each increased on 
average by £15 and £12 respectively over the same period. Disability benefits 
went from a negligible fraction to five percent of net household income, and 
income from other benefits increased from 12 percent to 17 percent. Although 
these were the most marked changes, they only partially offset the decline in 
employment earnings. 
 
Income from personal and occupational pensions also rose, from two per cent of 
household net income pre-onset, to seven per cent post-onset. (Income from 
investments and savings also increased but to a lesser extent.) The likely 
explanation for this is that some of the labour market withdrawal was treated as 
early retirement (whether explicitly on the grounds of ill-health or not), thereby 
releasing payments of pensions in advance of the state retirement pension age. 
In addition, average payments of direct taxes fell by some £23 per week 
between the base year and the year after onset (largely reflecting the reduction 
in labour earnings). 
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Table 4: Income sources before and after the onset of a disability for 
individuals disabled at least 2 years 
Income source (pounds per week) 
Two years 
before onset 
Onset 
year 
Year after 
onset 
Household net income  309 283 305 
 (as % of net income) (100) (100) (100) 
    
Respondent’s own labour income  167 113 106 
 (as % of net income) (54) (40) (35) 
    
Other household labour income  180 152 168 
 (as % of net income) (58) (54) (55) 
    
Household investment and savings income 8 10 13 
 (as % of net income) (3) (3) (4) 
    
Household occupational and personal pensions 6 19 21 
 (as % of net income) (2) (7) (7) 
    
Household private transfers 4 3 7 
 (as % of net income) (1) (1) (2) 
    
Own disability benefits 1 12 16 
 (as % of net income) (0) (4) (5) 
    
Household benefits less own disability benefits  39 47 51 
 (as % of net income) (12) (17) (17) 
    
Household income taxes & NIC –96 –73 –77 
 (as % of net income) (–31) (–26) (–25) 
 
Number of individuals = 273. A small number of high income outliers were excluded from 
the calculations. (From 1115 person-wave observations, 11 person-wave observations with 
income greater than £1000 were dropped.) Source: authors’ calculations using pooled data 
from BHPS waves 1–8. 
 
4.3  Variations in onset effects between individuals  
To what extent did the impact of disability onset vary across individuals? Were 
certain types of individuals more adversely affected than others? We explored 
this issue using multivariate analysis of three outcomes: exit from paid work, 
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change in log income, and the entry into low income. For this exercise, changes 
and transitions referred to those occurring between the base year and the onset 
year (years –2 and 0 in Figures 1–3) for all individuals who experienced 
disability onset and, for the transitions, who were at risk of the relevant events. 
The explanatory variables were the same as those used earlier. The estimates of 
the three models are summarised in Table 5. 
 
Table 5: Disability onset: multivariate analysis of changes in log income, 
entry to low-income, and stopping paid work  
 Pr(stopped 
paid work) 
Change in 
log(income) 
Pr(entered low 
income) 
Explanatory variables (1) (1) (2) 
(base year values) Odds ratio Coeff. Odds ratio 
Female ns ns ns 
Aged 35–49       2.754*** ns ns 
Aged 50+ ns ns ns 
No educ. qualifications ns ns ns 
In paid work – ns 0.170*** 
2 adults in household ns ns 0.212*** 
3+ adults in household ns ns 0.141*** 
1 child in household ns ns ns 
2+ children in household 0.394* ns 2.259* 
    
Mean of dependent variable 0.31 –0.08 0.25 
N 202 252 204 
R-squared  0.044  
Log-likelihood –118  –93 
 
Models (1) estimated by ordinary least squares; models (2) and (3) estimated by maximum 
likelihood logistic regression. Samples for (2), (3) are smaller than for (1) because they are 
based only on the subsamples at risk of the relevant event. Changes are between base year 
(two years before onset) and year of onset: see text. Also see the notes to Table 3. 
 
About 30 percent of those in work in the base year no longer worked in the 
onset year (Table 5, column (1)). The main deviations from this average 
transition rate were associated with demographic characteristics. For example, 
the odds of stopping work were almost three times as high for individuals aged 
35–49 than the odds for those of other age groups (odds ratio 2.8). Individuals 
in households with two or more children were, on the other hand, much less 
likely to stop paid work with disability onset (odds ratio 0.4). This may reflect 
 21 
necessity – a perception that benefits available when disabled would not cover 
household needs as well as earnings would. 
 
Income declined by 8 percent on average and there were no systematic 
relationships between changes in log income and personal characteristics: none 
of the odds ratios for the explanatory variables shown in column (2) were 
statistically significant. Differences in onset effects across individuals were 
more apparent when we focused on the chances of entering low income (column 
3). Among those who were not in the poorest fifth of the income distribution in 
the base year, the probability of entering low income in the year of onset was 25 
percent. However the odds of low-income entry were very much lower for those 
in paid work rather than not working (odds ratio 0.17), or in multi-adult rather 
than single-adult households. Having two or more dependent children more than 
doubled the risks of entering low income (odds ratio 2.3). 
 
Overall, there are some clear differences across individuals in the risks of 
stopping paid work, and of entering low income, over the period between the 
base year and the onset year. It is perhaps surprising that differences in 
educational qualifications appear not to be associated with differences in effects. 
(As it happens, point estimates of the odds ratios on the ‘no qualifications’ 
variables were all greater than one in the models, as expected.) When we 
estimated the models using samples based on the alternative definition of onset, 
i.e. requiring disability at only one rather than two consecutive interviews (see 
Introduction), it turned out that having no educational qualifications had large 
and statistically significant associations in the models corresponding to columns 
(2) and (3). This suggests that having educational qualifications provides better 
protection against the adverse effects of onset in the case of temporary disability 
spells. 
 
4.4  Variations in duration effects between individuals  
Describing individual differences in duration effects is complicated by the fact 
that there are two processes that are relevant. For someone beginning a 
disability spell, the expected disadvantage in spell year t is the probability of 
remaining disabled for at least t years multiplied by the disadvantage 
experienced in year t conditional on having remained disabled until then. 
Characteristics may have different impacts on each of the two processes. 
Indeed, there is a potential selection process in disability exit (as in disability 
entry), which changes the composition of the disabled population at risk of 
experiencing disadvantage. Our analysis examined both the probability of exit 
from disability and also changes in outcomes among the subsample remaining 
disabled.  
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The multivariate analysis of differences between individuals in disability exit 
probabilities focused on disability exit rates between the onset year and the third 
year of the spell. (This is year ‘+2’ in Figures 1–3. Recall that our onset 
definition means that all individuals are disabled for at least two years.) We also 
estimated more complex hazard regression models, including ones allowing for 
duration dependence in the exit rate as spells lengthened, but our discussion 
here refers to the simpler model because it yielded virtually the same 
conclusions. We were constrained by small sample sizes at longer spell lengths 
in any case.  
 
Column (1) of Table 6 shows the logistic regression model estimates. There 
were some systematic deviations in chances of exit from disability from the 
sample average rate of 26 percent. For example, the odds of leaving disability 
were some 80 percent higher for women compared to men and, compared to 
those not working in the onset year, the odds of disability exit for those in paid 
work were very much higher (odds ratio 3.3). Persons aged 35–49 were half as 
likely to exit disability as older, or younger, individuals. By contrast, the 
numbers of children and adults in the household had no statistically significant 
association with the risk of exit. Although lack of educational qualifications had 
no statistically significant association with disability exit rates, when we 
repeated the regression substituting a binary measure of whether the respondent 
had A-levels or higher qualifications for the ‘no qualifications’ measure, the 
estimated odds ratio on the new qualifications variables was 1.46 (p = 0.03), 
with effects for other variables unchanged. This provides some support for our 
‘selection out of disability’ story.  
 
Changes in circumstances over the first two years of the disability spell among 
individuals remaining disabled at least two years are shown in columns (2)–(4) 
of Table 6. Among individuals who were working in the year of disability onset, 
the chances of stopping work were very much higher for those with no 
educational qualifications: the odds ratio is a massive 4.16. (This is against the 
background of a decline in the overall employment rate as disability spells 
lengthened: see Figure 1.) Workers with two or more children were less likely 
than other workers to stop paid work (odds ratio 0.24).  
 
What about income changes? Looking at income changes over the first two 
disability years among all individuals who were disabled for at least two years 
(column 3), we found that women experienced an increase in income of around 
14 percent compared to men and, for persons without educational qualifications, 
income fell by some 14 percent compared to those with qualifications. By 
contrast, for those who were in paid work in the onset year, income fell by about 
15 percent. This reflects the fact that a substantial fraction of these individuals 
stopped work in the year after disability onset (Figure 1).  
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Table 6: After disability onset: multivariate analysis of the probability of 
exit from disability, and changes in income and employment (individuals 
disabled at least two years)  
 Pr(exited 
disability in 
year three) 
Changes between year of onset  
and next year 
  Pr(stopped 
paid work) 
Change in 
log income 
Pr(exited low 
income) 
Explanatory variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
(onset year values) Odds ratio Odds ratio Coeff. Odds ratio 
Female 1.801* ns     0.139** ns 
Aged 35–49 0.508* ns ns ns 
Aged 50+ ns ns ns ns 
No educ. qualifications ns 4.162** –0.139* ns 
In paid work 3.272** –   –0.150** ns 
2 adults in household ns ns ns 3.192* 
3+ adults in household ns ns ns   6.484** 
1 child in household ns ns ns ns 
2+ children in household ns 0.244** ns 0.200** 
     
Mean of dependent variable 0.26 0.17 0.06 0.40 
N  214 145 260 88 
R-squared   0.112  
Log-likelihood –115 –52  –52 
 
Models (1), (3), (4) estimated by maximum likelihood logistic regression; model (2) 
estimated by ordinary least squares. Samples for (2), (4) are smaller than for (3) because they 
are based only on the subsamples at risk of the relevant event (working, and has high income, 
respectively). Also see the notes to Table 3. 
 
Column (4) of Table 6 shows estimates of a model of rates of exit from low 
income between the onset year and the following year. (We report models of 
low-income exit rather than low-income entry, because the low-income rate fell 
over this two-year period: see Figure 3.) The only variables with statistically 
significant associations were demographic ones. Odds of exit were 80 percent 
lower for respondents with two or more children compared to others. And, 
compared to single adult households, the exit rates were much higher for 
individuals in a household with two adults (odds ratio 3.2) or with three or more 
adults (odds ratio 6.5). The explanation for this is not obvious, but one 
explanation could be that these variables were picking up moves into work by 
either the respondent or another household member against the general trend for 
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falling employment (the more adults there are in a household, the more possible 
this is).  
 
5.  Summary and conclusions 
This paper has argued that our understanding of the economic disadvantage 
faced by those who are disabled at a point in time can benefit from using a 
longitudinal perspective. Current disadvantage may reflect three different 
processes: the selection into disability, the impact of disability onset and the 
impact of remaining disabled post-onset.  
 
Using BHPS data covering 1991–8, we found that individuals who became 
disabled were typically more disadvantaged before onset than other individuals 
also at risk of onset but who did not become disabled. Not having any 
educational qualifications and not being in paid work prior to onset were factors 
that were associated with this selection effect. Both of these characteristics was 
associated with a higher chance of becoming disabled and also with having 
worse economic outcomes more generally.  
 
Selection effects were not the whole story, however: there were also onset and 
duration effects. Disability onset was associated with marked declines in the 
likelihood of being in paid work and in average income, and with a rise in the 
low-income rate. There was variation around these averages, however, 
particularly in the chances of entering low income between the base year and 
the onset year. For example, low-income entry chances were smaller for 
individuals in paid work, or in a multi-adult household. The impact of duration 
effects on employment were marked and straightforward: employment rates fell 
continuously with disability duration. The duration effects with respect to 
income were more complicated. In the year after disability onset, there was a 
recovery in median income and low-income rates fell, on average, though low-
income rates increased in subsequent years of disability. Among persons 
becoming disabled, the marked decline in income from employment was 
partially replaced by benefit income (and, to a lesser extent, personal and 
occupational pension income). Although social security benefits had an 
ameliorative role in the intended direction, the rate of replacement was low.  
 
Among persons becoming disabled, the marked decline in income from 
employment was partially offset by higher benefit income (and, to a lesser 
extent, personal and occupational pension income). Although social security 
benefits had an ameliorative role in the intended direction, the rate of 
replacement was low.  
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What do the results suggest about other (non-benefit-related) measures that have 
been introduced to support disabled people? These have been wide-ranging in 
nature, but perhaps the most important of recent initiatives have been the New 
Deal for Disabled People, introduced in 1998 (with planned extensions in 2003–
4 that pilot rehabilitation schemes to keep people in work if they become ill), 
and the Disabled Persons Tax Credit for low-income working disabled people. 
Common to these measures is a desire to (re)connect disabled people to the 
world of employment and for them to retain their jobs when they have them. 
This is clear from the government’s statements that ‘[a]n increase in the 
employment rates … of people with disabilities … and a reduction in the 
difference between their employment rates and the overall rate’ are targets 
against which to assess progress towards reduction in social exclusion and 
poverty (Department of Social Security, 1999, p. 31). If these employment-
targeted policies are successful, then they will help to offset the striking decline 
in employment rates that occurs not only at disability onset but also continues as 
disability spells lengthen. 
 
Maintaining employment among disabled people depends not only on the 
individuals concerned, however. It is also contingent on there being jobs 
available, and recognition that adaptations to workplaces and reorganisation of 
jobs may be required. The Disability Discrimination Act (1995), and the 
Disability Rights Commission, established in April 2000 with the aim of 
supporting disabled people and their employers and service providers, are steps 
in the right direction, but they are unlikely to have a major impact on 
employment rates. As Berthoud has pointed out, the ‘Disability Discrimination 
Act … provides a clear statement of employers’ obligations, but its 
individualised approach – based on one disabled person’s experience of 
applying for one vacancy – is unlikely to have a substantial effect on thousands 
of firms and millions of candidates’ (1998, p. 39). For a review of the limited 
progress being made on adjustments by employers and service providers, see 
Meager et al. (2002). 
 
Our findings about selection effects also signal a cautionary note. All the 
measures cited so far are focused on helping people who are already disabled, 
but a non-trivial part of their disadvantage reflects circumstances existing prior 
to the onset of disability. Policies targeted on people who are disabled may not 
eliminate this aspect. Design of alternative targeting mechanisms is constrained 
by the fact that it is difficult to ascertain ex ante who is or is not going to 
become disabled. Our multivariate analysis suggests that there may be pay-offs 
to various non-specific measures, however. For example, the results pointed to 
how the possession of educational qualifications helped protect individuals from 
being ‘selected’ into disability. (This is over and above any role that educational 
qualifications may have in determining whether someone has a job or not.) But 
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even if skill levels can be raised universally, a real policy challenge remains – 
how to equalise the chances of job entry and retention for disabled and non-
disabled persons with the same qualifications and skills – which returns us to 
the issues raised in the previous paragraph. 
 
Overall, the paper’s findings underscore the importance of learning more about 
the processes underlying disability and disadvantage. They also highlight the 
relevance of longitudinal surveys for monitoring and modelling disability 
trajectories. Clearly the BHPS is a rich source of data for examining these 
issues, but cell sizes remain a constraint on analysis. If there were a new 
national disability survey, we would recommend adding longitudinal elements 
to the survey design. The easiest way to do this would be to add questions about 
disability onset dates and about circumstances prior to onset (including for 
example employment and benefit receipt histories). 
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